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an excellent case study in this area. Nevertheless, policy 
analysts who want to understand the development of com- 
munications policy will find the historical data useful. 
Despite its shortcomings, Shipan's book offers very impor- 
tant theoretical arguments about the interactions of various 
political institutions. An especially useful insight is the evi- 
dence presented that interest groups understand the impor- 
tance of procedural provisions sometimes hidden away in 
complex legislation. The rational choice framework also 
reminds us that interest groups want to influence future 
policy choices as well as current policy decisions. The argu- 
ment that Congress anticipates future judicial decisions dur- 
ing the deliberation of initial legislation is also useful. At- 
tempting to tie together Congress, the agencies, the courts, 
and interest groups is a difficult task, but Shipan has done a 
good job of increasing our understanding of the interactions 
among these political actors. More work needs to be done 
along these lines. 
Presidential-Congressional Relations: Policy and Time Ap- 
proaches. By Steven A. Shull. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997. 178p. $42.50. 
Cary R. Covington, University of Iowa 
Steven Shull, in collaboration with chapter coauthors Johnny 
Goldfinger (chap. 2), Thomas C. Shaw (chap. 5), and Brad T. 
Gomez (chap. 7), provides an extensive compilation of 
analyses of various measures of presidential activity, success, 
and support on roll-call votes, as well as executive orders, for 
presidents Eisenhower through Clinton. Shull's fundamental 
insight and premise is that differences in the types of policies 
on which members vote, and differences in the time during a 
presidential term that members cast their votes, can help us 
understand why presidents succeed and why members sup- 
port them. These are promising lines of inquiry, and Shull's 
book offers a useful first foray. 
In the first three chapters, Shull lays out the foundations 
for his analysis. Chapter 1 traces the development of studies 
that address (1) the relative importance of presidents and 
Congress in the legislative process and (2) the implications 
that differences in the substance of the policies being consid- 
ered for enactment have on the prospects for presidential 
leadership. Based on his review of these literatures, Shull lays 
out his plan for studying the effect that policy types and the 
time during a president's term in which they arise have on 
presidential success and support. Chapter 2 presents the 
rationale for employing three frameworks for distinguishing 
among types of policies: (1) the common "two presidencies" 
(foreign versus domestic) distinction; (2) Lowi's four func- 
tional policy types (Theodore J. Lowi, "Four Systems of 
Policy, Politics, and Choice," Public Administration Review 32 
[1972]: 298-310); and (3) a multiple policy framework devel- 
oped by Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale (The Elusive Executive: 
Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency, 1988). In 
chapter 3, Shull discusses the methodological issues that arise 
regarding the measurement and meaning af his variables. In 
addition, he lays out in abbreviated form his expectations for 
how differences in policy types and timing in a presidential 
term should relate to presidential success and support. 
In chapters 4-8, Shull presents the results of his inquiries. 
His observations are too numerous to summarize, but it is 
helpful to identify the dependent variables Shull employs in 
each chapter. Chapter 4 notes variations across presidents in 
the frequency with which they take positions on roll-call 
votes. Shull looks for patterns according to policy types and 
the year in the presidential terms in which the votes took 
place. Chapter 5 describes patterns in different measures of 
the level of controversy that presidents experience on legis- 
lative activity. Chapter 6 identifies patterns in the mean 
percentage of members who support the president. Chapter 7 
shifts the focus to executive orders, again looking for patterns 
in their use according to policy type and timing in the 
president's term. Chapter 8 provides Shull's summary and 
conclusions. 
Shull is to be commended for the prodigious effort he and 
his coauthors have made in pushing the boundaries of the 
analysis of presidential-congressional relations in new direc- 
tions. Most of these chapters begin the process of under- 
standing what was heretofore relatively uncharted territory. 
Shull has a thorough understanding and appreciation of the 
strengths and limitations of the variables he analyzes, and he 
brings out the nuances of meaning and differences in the 
meanings attached to each. 
Not surprisingly, this book has some of the limitations that 
often come when undertaking this sort of charting expedi- 
tion, most of which Shull acknowledges. He relies almost 
exclusively on various bivariate analyses. As a result, he is 
largely unable to control for the effects of possibly confound- 
ing variables. He also employs relatively simple analytical 
techniques, relying on means and percentages to describe the 
effects of the parameters of policy types and timing on the 
dependent variables. Ultimately, the reader wants some sort 
of comprehensive, integrative analysis that pulls the various 
threads presented in the various chapters into a cohesive 
whole and evaluates their relative merits and effects on 
presidential involvement in the legislative process. Shull 
emphasizes broad patterns in the data, at the expense of 
providing only a sketchy theoretical foundation to explain the 
patterns he finds. The bases for his expectations would have 
benefited from a more extended treatment in chapter 3. 
This book is a useful pioneering effort. Shull and his 
coauthors do not provide the last or definitive word on how 
policy types or timing affect presidential success and support. 
Rather, they lay out some interesting lines of research and 
present some intriguing findings that may prove to be the 
beginning of an ongoing investigation into the factors that 
shape a president's relations with Congress. 
Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on 
the U.S. Supreme Court. By Harold J. Spaeth and Jeffrey 
A. Segal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
315p. $59.95. 
Donald R. Songer, University of South Carolina 
This book examines the influence of precedent versus the 
influence of personal ideological values on the behavior of 
justices throughout the Supreme Court's history. The au- 
thors, in a very straightforward manner, expand the analysis 
in their recent journal article (Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. 
Spaeth, "The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of 
United States Supreme Court Justices," American Journal of 
Political Science 40 [November 1996]: 971-1004). Rather 
than the limited period in the article, the entire history of the 
Court, from 1787 to 1995, is covered in the book. 
The article generated spirited controversy among judicial 
scholars about the role of precedent in the decisions of the 
Court. The November 1996 issue of the American Journal of 
Political Science contained four articles critical of the Segal 
and Spaeth approach and a response to these critics. One 
might expect that the book would represent "round 2," with 
the authors further developing the evidence and arguments 
in support of their position, but Spaeth and Segal restate 
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their position vigorously and virtually ignore the arguments 
of their critics. 
The primary focus of Majority Rule is an empirical test of 
whether the votes of Supreme Court justices are determined 
by the Court's own precedent or reflect their ideological 
preferences. "Does precedent actually cause justices to reach 
decisions that they otherwise would not have made" (p. 7)? 
The authors conceptualize this question as involving a dichot- 
omous choice. They assume that a vote is determined solely 
by either precedent or judicial ideology. They do not attempt 
to test whether, and do not even allow the possibility that, the 
votes and policies adopted by the justices can be jointly 
influenced by both. 
Analysis centers on the behavior of justices in cases 
labelled the "progeny" of earlier cases that set precedent. 
The assumption is that, if the Legal Model is accurate, votes 
in these progeny cases should be controlled by the parent 
case. Only the progeny votes of justices who dissented in the 
precedent case are examined, as one can make no firm 
conclusions about the motivations of the justices who were 
part of the majority in the precedent. In the case of those who 
dissented in the precedent, it may objectively be determined 
that the precedent was contrary to their ideological prefer- 
ences. Thus, their votes in the progeny can be classified 
"objectively" as supporting either precedent or their prefer- 
ences. 
Spaeth and Segal examine all the votes of the dissenters in 
all the orally argued progeny of the universe of a list of the 
"landmark" decisions of the Court and a sample of the 
nonunanimous "ordinary" decisions of the Court. In all, 
2,425 votes cast by 77 justices in the 1,206 progeny of 341 
precedential cases are examined. The conclusions of the 
authors are unambiguous and can be easily summarized: 
"The justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis" (p. 288). 
In only 11.9% of the votes did Spaeth and Segal find any 
evidence that the justices were influenced by precedent. 
Moreover, the domination of precedent by the ideological 
preferences of the justices was found in every era of the 
Court's history and characterized voting in the progeny of 
both the landmark and the ordinary cases. 
The major new contribution of this study is the systematic, 
careful manner in which Spaeth and Segal extend analyses 
premised on the Attitudinal Model to the entire history of the 
Court. Too often, theories in public law are based on 
snapshots gleaned from the cross-sectional analyses of brief 
periods of the Court's history. Truly rigorous empirical 
studies of nineteenth-century judicial behavior are virtually 
nonexistent, and even systematic longitudinal studies of the 
past century are rare. Even those who reject the methodolog- 
ical assumptions, and thus the conclusions, of Spaeth and 
Segal will find their application of a consistent theoretical 
perspective and a common mode of analysis to the entire 
history of the Court to be of great value. The analysis 
provides additional strong evidence that the ideological 
values of justices do frequently influence their votes and that 
this role of ideology has been at work consistently throughout 
the history of the Court. The evidence that many of the votes 
of justices from every era of the Court are consistent with 
their ideological preferences is persuasive. Thus, the analysis 
does much to discredit previous arguments that the Court in 
recent years or a relatively small number of recent "activist" 
justices are unique in their tendency to vote according to 
ideological preferences. 
While the evidence that the ideological values of the 
justices influence their votes is compelling, the conclusion 
that precedent does not matter will continue to be contro- 
versial, and it is unlikely that this latest defense will convert 
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any former critics. The key points of disagreement will center 
on the conceptual and operational definitions of "progeny" 
and on the decision rules used to evaluate the decisions of 
justices in those progeny cases. A case is generally considered 
a progeny of a given precedent if the syllabus of the progeny 
indicates that the majority relied on the precedent case. 
This strategy undoubtably produces a list of cases for which 
the identified precedent is relevant, but many who engage in 
traditional legal analysis or who teach constitutional law will 
question whether these precedents preclude, as a matter of 
law, the positions that Sapeth and Segal classify as opposed to 
precedent. Instead, many of the progeny will be viewed by 
other scholars as involving questions of law that are related to 
the issues resolved in the precedent but which were not 
answered in any definitive way by those cases. I suspect, for 
example, that most scholars who have taught constitutional 
law would not consider that the decision of the Court in 
Schick v. Reed (1974) to deny relief to a petitioner whose 
death sentence had been commuted to life in prison was 
contrary to the precedent set in Furman v. Georgia (1972). 
Similarly, I doubt that most would consider the majority 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), which adopted a death 
penalty scheme that was patterned closely on the plurality 
opinions of Stewart and White in Furman v. Georgia (1972), 
to be contrary to the precedent set in Furman. Thus, while 
Spaeth and Segal have attempted to devise an "objective" 
test of whether the votes of justices follow precedent, the 
validity of their judgments will continue to be a source of 
controversy within the field. 
Curiously, most scholars who have studied the certiorari 
process from the perspective of the Attitudinal Model at least 
implicitly reject the Spaeth and Segal conception of progeny. 
Such studies suggest that justices select cases in order to 
make new policy, that is, they deliberately select cases in 
which precedent provides no clear answer so that they can 
create new precedent that moves policy in either a liberal or 
conservative direction. Potential progeny for which clear 
precedent exists are typically denied certiorari. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Spaeth and 
Segal analysis will be their decision to rule out-by definition 
rather than by empirical examination-the possibility of joint 
influence from precedent and ideology. They deny, without 
investigating, the possibility that precedent may exert a 
"gravitational" pull on the behavior of justices that may limit 
and constrain the expression of their ideological preferences 
without dictating a precise policy to adopt. If precedent does 
exert such a pull, then justices with different ideological 
preferences may all still seek to maximize the attainment of 
their policy goals within the parameters set by precedent. In 
fact, even if precedent exerts a gravitational pull on all 
decisions of all justices, one still might expect that their votes 
would scale and that their behavior in progeny cases would 
approximate the behavior discovered by Spaeth and Segal. 
In summary, this book is likely to be evaluated as providing 
additional strong evidence that the ideological preferences of 
justices have frequently influenced their decisions throughout 
our history, but it will not resolve the controversy over 
whether precedent also influences those votes. 
Understanding State Constitutions. By G. Alan Tarr. Prince- 
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 247p. $35.00. 
John Kincaid, Lafayette College 
Many Americans are not aware that their state of residence 
has its own constitution, even though they may be asked to 
vote regularly on its amendments and even though the state 
